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Abstract 
Scholars have emphasized the scientific and the rationalist features of Althusser's work, but few have 
noted its post-structuralist aspects, especially its Foucauldian accounts of discourse and power. In the 
early Pour Marx, Althusser divides ideological practices from objective science and theoretical norms 
from empirical facts; however, in several later essays Althusser repudiates his earlier faith in theory's 
normative force as well as his broad distinction between science and ideology. He argues that every 
discipline establishes its own relationship between its ideological history and its formal, scientific ideals. 
This argument, together with Althusser's earlier rejection of totalizing approaches, establishes important 
parallels with Foucault's archaeological studies. The literary theory of Tony Bennett, who develops a 
Foucauldian critique of traditional and Marxist aesthetics, illuminates the rich implications of these 
parallels for cultural analyses. 
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The spectacular collapse of the USSR and other Communist states 
has only exacerbated the hostile relationship of Marxism and postmodern 
theory. On the one hand, Marxists complain that postmodern theorists 
refuse to see society as a whole or to preserve culture's autonomous 
ideals (Best and Kellner 220; Jameson, "Regarding Postmodernism" 
39). On the other hand, postmodern theorists fear that Marxism cannot 
overcome its totalitarian nature or answer its poststructuralist oppo- 
nents (Poster 38-39; Barrett 157-61). Even the innovative theory of 
Louis Althusser suffers from this debilitating opposition. Scientific 
realists praise the Althusser who fears that liberal humanist beliefs 
destroy the objectivity of Marxist theory; theoretical rationalists esteem 
the Althusser who defends the autonomous norms of formal thought, 
but postmodern theorists complain that Althusser, along with the 
Marxist tradition, cannot assimilate the twentieth century world of 
discourse, media, and high-tech communications. I mean to show that, 
in addition to the scientific and the rationalist stance, Althusserian 
theory develops a postmodern stance that resists the totalitarian char- 
acter of its predecessors and elaborates a Foucauldian account of 
knowledge. Moreover, the literary theory of Tony Bennett, who 
criticizes traditional and Marxist aesthetics in these Foucauldian terms, 
outlines the rich implications of this Althusser for cultural study. 
The Scientific Althusser 
Objective, scientific, but hardly postmodern, the first Althusser 
emerges in Pour Marx, which brings together his essays on the young 
Marx, dialectics, theater, science, and humanism. When he wrote these 
essays in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, Marxism-Leninism, the 
French Communist party, and the French Left enjoyed a high prestige 
inconceivable in post-Communist America. At the same time, the on- 
going revelations of Stalinist dogma and brutality led Althusser to fear 
that an intrusive, non-scientific humanism was corrupting Marxist 
theory. 
To defend the integrity of a scientific Marxism, he critiques 
humanist accounts of Karl Marx. He grants that Feuerbach's humanism 1
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influenced the young Marx, but he argues that Marx repudiated this 
speculative humanism and adopted a scientific outlook. A critic of 
established religion, Feuerbach argued that by attributing society's 
powers to God, religion alienates human kind from its essential powers 
or "species-being." Even though a society's art, science, industry, 
government, or education produced impressive works, the established 
religion attributed these achievements to God's will, divine providence, 
or some equally mystical figure, not to humanity's social powers. A 
critic of Hegel, Feuerbach also argued that what Hegel called the 
"cunning of reason" mystified social forces in a similar way; they 
simply develop the pre-determined rationality of the world spirit, not 
the potentiality of their own powers. Althusser admits that this secular, 
humanist critique of religion and Hegel allowed Marx "to think the 
contradiction between the essence of the state [reason] and its existence 
[unreason]" (Pour Marx 231; my translation). Still, Althusser insists 
that in The German Ideology Marx discovered the fault of Feuerbach's 
theory: it remains speculative. Like Hegel, Feuerbach does not abstract 
the theoretical concepts ofthe mind from the nature ofempirical reality. 
He idly deduces empirical reality from the mind's concepts and denies, 
as a result, the authenticating force of what Marx calls "sensuous 
human activity" (German 197). Marx recognizes that Feuerbach 
repudiates Hegel's alienated reconstruction of society's essential pow- 
ers but not Hegel's speculative reconstruction of scientific concepts. 
Althusser suggests that, unlike Feuerbach, Marx rejects this speculative 
self-consciousness and goes on to develop a purely scientific Marxism. 
As Althusser says, the "rupture with . . . all philosophical humanism is 
not a secondary detail; it is one with the scientific discovery of Marx" 
(Pour Marx 234). 
Some critics say that this account of Marx's rupture with Hegelian 
theory justifies the unjustifiable dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, the 
French Communist Party, or the Stalinist USSR (Barrett 87-88; 
Fougeyrollas 20-22; Jay 405, 411). Other critics say that this account 
of a Marxist science rejects only Stalinist "humanism," not all 
Hegelian theory (Aronowitz 124-25; Jameson Political 27). These 
contrary views misconstrue Althusser's account of Marx's rupture with 
Feuerbach and, more generally, Hegelian humanism. Primarily philo- 
sophical, this account assumes that Marxist theory is a hermeneutic 
practice subverting the theoretical self-consciousness of Hegelian 
theory. In Reading Capital, Althusser, whose colleague at the Ecole 
Normal Superieure was Jacques Derrida, says that Marxist philosophy 
is a circular hermeneutic, not a transcendent truth. Marxist philosophy 
construes knowledge in a phenomenological manner, as a circular 2




application of the very beliefs which the traditional humanist expects 
the external world to betray (34). At the same time, Althusser denies that 
this metaphysical closure contains scientific theory. Scientific theory 
does not simply describe what lies outside the circle of western 
metaphysics; this theory escapes the hermeneutic circle because Marx's 
rupture with Hegelian humanism opens up a radically new space, the 
positive space of history (54). 
Some critics complain that this account fails to identify the 
specific point at which Marx breaks with Hegelian humanism and 
develops this new scientific theory (Steven Smith 506). This objection 
is well-known but misleading: a hermeneutic practice that deconstructs 
the metaphysical language of Hegelian theory does not divide Hegelian 
humanism and scientific theory so neatly. Other critics object that a 
phenomenological hermeneutics favors indeterminacy, free play, and 
difference. To retain scientific truth, especially the well-known, eco- 
nomic determination, is to repress the indeterminacy fostered by this 
hermeneutics (Parker 59-60). This objection is forceful but one-sided: 
Althusser's hermeneutics is rationalist, not Heideggerian nor Derridean. 
In a Cartesian manner Althusser allows the skeptical doubt of the 
phenomenologist but preserves the objective truths of the scientist. 
The Rationalist Althusser 
The rationalist Althusser does not abandon the scientific objectiv- 
ity of Marxist theory; he assimilates the science to the rationalist's 
theoretical norms. That is to say, he defines science in a formal, not in 
a dogmatic way: it can grasp reality only if it rigorously develops its 
concepts and its terms, not if it conforms with practice, fact, or truth. 
In these formal terms, scientific theory establishes its own criteria of 
truth. By contrast, what Althusser calls ideology imposes the familiar 
conformity of theory and practice or ideas and facts. This anti-humanist 
conformity is not altogether negative. It is well known that he endowed 
ideology with a positive role: it constructs ("interpellates") a subject. 
Ideology does not represent falsehood or misrepresentation; ideology 
explains the subject's role in a society's socio-economic structure- 
what Althusser calls the subject's relation to the relations of production. 
Nonetheless, because theory preserves its own criteria of validity, he 
claimed that theory resists this ideological interpellation and effec- 
tively grasps the nature of reality. As scholars have shown, Althusser 
believed that precise, scientific theory escapes the corrosive force of 
discourse and reflects the true nature of the real. 3
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Some critics say that this account of a scientific theory betrays the 
rationalist's unduly optimistic belief that some preordained harmony 
brings nature and reason together (Glucksman 289; Aronowitz 180-81). 
Other scholars object that this notion of theory renders it autonomous, 
if not neutral. As Dominick LaCapra says, Althusser favors a subtle 
"positivist" scientism that denies the ideological character of objec- 
tive science (13,166; Aronowitz 173; Belsey 62-64). Still other scholars 
accept Althusser's account of a scientific theory but reject his account 
of the subject and its ideologies. These scholars complain that this 
account reduces "virtually any aspect of contemporary society" to "a 
symptom of `bourgeois' ideology" (McClellan 82), fragments and 
fetishizes the subject and inflates and absolutizes language (Anderson 
Tracks 55), or imposes a robotlike, "functionalist" conformity with 
established discourse (Montag 72; Hirst 43-6). 
The Post-Structuralist Althusser 
Michele Barrett suggests that while Foucault's account of dis- 
course answers such objections well enough, they destroy not only 
Althusser's account of ideology and science but the broad Marxist 
account as well (157-61; Poster 38-39). I admit that Althusser does not 
answer them. Still, he does respond to them, and his responses outline 
a third, poststructuralist self-extending Marxist theory. In PourMarx he 
clearly defends the rationalist belief that theory possesses formal 
criteria of validity enabling it to distinguish scientific from ideological 
claims. Still, in Reading Capital, where he distinguishes between 
philosophy and science, he repudiates the "foundational" rationalism 
of Pour Marx, vehemently insisting that he does not seek any such 
guarantees of a theory's truth) He does not give up the idea that theory 
grasps reality, but he denies that theory reduces practice to a slavish 
instrument of an autonomous mind. He argues that theory follows its 
own practices, and practice presupposes its own theory. Indeed, the 
widespread belief that theory and practice form a harmonious unity he 
considers a ridiculous myth perpetuated by Hegelian or Sartrian 
humanists. 
Moreover, in his later works he repudiates the autonomous norms 
enabling theory to subvert ideology. He calls the defense of these norms 
the error of "theoreticism," and, rejecting the broad distinction 
between theory and ideology, he argues that economics, history, 
philosophy, mathematics, science, and other disciplines and practices 
establish their own "inner" criteria of validity and produce their own 
legitimate objects and discourses. These disciplines create what Althusser 4




calls a "knowledge effect," not cognitive truths nor autonomous facts 
(60-63). He means that an authoritative exponent of a discipline 
considers a particular theory legitimate knowledge because the theory 
conforms with the discipline's conventions, languages, procedures, or 
protocols, not with an external reality. What Althusser terms a "prob- 
lematic," which is this ensemble of a discipline's conventions and 
discourses, explains why the exponents of a discipline accept certain 
theories at one time and other theories at another time. Just as Foucault 
assumes that the episteme structuring a discipline explains the cognitive 
force of its discourses, so Althusser argues that the problematics of a 
discipline explain its "knowledge-effects." 
I do not mean to imply that this Foucauldian account of knowledge 
resolves the difficulties of Althusser's scientific or rationalist stances. 
I mean to say that, even though this stance may not be consistent with 
the other stances, this Foucauldian stance gives Althusser the 
poststructuralist self that Barrett and others deny him. My reader may 
object that these scholars do not simply ignore his Foucauldian theory; 
they consider Marxism a closed, outmoded doctrine as viable and 
compelling as Ptolomaic astronomy and Greek divination. I grant this 
objection. In Foucault, Marxism and History, Mark Poster says that 
Marxism describes past eras, when production, factories, machines, and 
workers were central, whereas poststructuralists depict the modern era, 
in which communication, ideology, and discourse are central. Simi- 
larly, in The Politics of Truth Michele Barrett, who defends the 
traditional humanist belief that political movements require agency, 
intention, and human nature, insists that Karl Marx's unwavering 
commitment to scientific truth and class struggle establishes the 
essentially anti-feminist, totalitarian nature of any and all Marxisms (3- 
4). 
Tony Bennett, Literary Theory, Poststructuralism 
The work ofTony Bennett, who rejects the theoretical ideals of the 
scientists and the rationalists, challenges this belief in an unchanging, 
outdated Marxism. In literary terms, Bennett denies the aesthetic 
grounds of textual analyses and emphasizes the historical and institu- 
tional contexts of literary reception. In Outside Literature, Bennett says 
that literary theory cannot tell critics what correct readings must look 
like. Like Stanley Fish, who has argued that theory cannot produce valid 
interpretations or resolve critical disputes, Bennett insists that theoreti- 
cal norms cannot regulate interpretive practices (see Fish "Conse- 
quences," 36-40). Moreover, he claims that scholars who make theory 5
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such a criterion of truth accept what he calls bourgeois aesthetics, which 
requires a critic to show that his or her judgments of value possess 
universal validity. Bennett argues that this aesthetic theory does not 
successsfully overcome the opposition between universal values and 
the critic's subjective taste. David Hume admits that different persons, 
cultures, and eras show a remarkable diversity of taste, but he still insists 
that humankind shows an equally remarkable uniformity of judgment. 
He argues that the distinct character of the authoritative critic ensures 
that his or her judgements are universally valid, yet he grants that even 
these authoritative critics differ. Bennett also says that in Kant's view, 
individual judgments of value must employ the universal terms "good" 
and "bad," even though these judgments are subjective and hypotheti- 
cal. Critics talk as though everyone must share their taste, but only the 
hypothetical assumption of a common human nature or a common sense 
gives these judgments their universality (Outside Literature 150-66). 
Bennett also suggests that Marxist humanists imitate these "bour- 
geois" aestheticians. For example, he says that Hegelian Marxists like 
Georg Lukacs and Lucien Goldmann explain canonical works in 
profound, socio-historical terms but ignore the canon's origins, recep- 
tion, and exclusions. Adopting the established canon, these critics 
assume that the immanent value of canonical works will become clear 
and plain in the communist era, when a rational subject will finally 
emerge. Aesthetic judgments can escape the historical relativity of the 
established canon because Marxist theory ensures that when history 
ends, the universality of the texts' values will be self-evident. (Outside 
Literature 31-33; "Marxism" 140-41; "Texts" 13). 
Bennett says that scientific Althusserians also seek to overcome the 
traditional uneasiness with arbitrary or subjective judgments. However, 
the Althusserians argue that a scientific stance exposes the ideological 
incoherence, distortion, and gaps hidden by a text and, as a result, 
aesthetic judgments acquire the objectivity of socio-historical truths. 
Althusserian critics grant literary forms the quasi-scientific ability to 
expose ideology's incoherence and gaps, but the Althusserian faith in 
scientific theory preserves the rationalist belief that objective truth lies 
outside cultural discourse (Outside Literature 126-37). 
Bennett denies not only that aesthetic norms justify this ideological 
critique but also that totalizing, theoretical self-consciousness under- 
mines institutions or produces historical change. However, while most 
postmodern scholars take this repudiation of theory to destroy ideologi- 
cal criticism, Bennett's Althusserian stance preserves it. For example, 
like Bennett, Richard Rorty insists that theory does not ground knowl- 
edge, but Rorty critiques traditional epistemology, not aesthetics. In 6




The Consequences of Pragmatism, for example, he complains that 
while Platonists, empiricists, and Kantians fiercely oppose each other's 
views, they all defend epistemological criteria of truth. The Platonist 
argues that the unity and autonomy of Being justifies his belief that the 
rational mind can escape its subjective predispositions and grasp the 
objective nature of reality. The empiricist argues that sense data, raw 
feels, distinct impressions or strong intuitions can expose the meta- 
physical character of nonsense and ground the positive assertions of 
legitimate theory. The Kantian, who seeks a third way between 
Platonism and empiricism, argues that the presuppositions of knowl- 
edge represent universal rules enabling an individual to escape his or her 
subjectivity and to establish the universal framework of knowledge. 
Rorty complains that, despite these epistemological differences, the 
Platonist, the empiricist, and the Kantian all assume that epistemologi- 
cal criteria enable one to escape one's determinate historical context or 
"vocabularies" and to grasp certain, objective truth. 
Like Bennett, Rorty forcefully debunks this traditional quest for 
epistemological certainty. However, an unredeemed liberal, he consid- 
ers postmodern theorists like Derrida and Foucault self-conscious 
ironists, not public theorists. His argument is that these theorists do not 
make propositional kinds of argument; they critique our vocabularies, 
denying that any vocabulary and, hence, any rules or conventions are 
final. As a consequence, their "ironizing" does not escape their private 
subjectivity. In his view, " [i]ronist theorists like Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Derrida, and Foucault seem to me invaluable in our attempt to form a 
private self-image, but pretty much useless when it comes to politics" 
(Contingency 83). Moreover, identifying literary criticism with this 
"ironizing," he claims that criticism too is "largely irrelevant to public 
life" (Contingency 83). Nancy Fraser rightly objects that Rorty would 
"require us to turn our backs on the last hundred years of social history" 
(102). 
By contrast, Bennett shows that postmodern theory undertakes 
valuable ideological criticism. In Bond and Beyond, he and Janet 
Woollacott argue that a literary text functions as a passive arena within 
which the proponents of different "intertextual" strategies make their 
views prevail. As Bennett and Woollacott say, " [t]exts constitute sites 
around which the pre-eminently social affair of the struggle for the 
production of meaning is conducted" (Bond 59-60). The intentions of 
an author or the figures of a text do not reveal the objective truth or 
constrain the activity of readers. Rather, what Bennett and Woollacott 
call the "production of meaning" is a "pre-eminently social affair" 
because readers are situated within and constructed by subjective 7
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institutional structures or, to use his term, "reading formations." To 
interpret a text is to contest its terrain, to vindicate one's methods and 
ideologies, and, by implication if not by explicit assertion, to debunk 
opposed methods and ideologies. 
Stanley Fish and Barbara Herrnstein Smith also favor a subjective 
account ofliterary criticism. They believe that the beliefs and the values 
of the reader explain his or her interpretation of a text. Smith argues that 
the traditional "axiology" of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and other 
modem aestheticians seeks but fails to impose absolute norms of 
universal value. She asserts that these aestheticians do not successfully 
overcome the subjectivity of individual taste and the relativity of 
individual beliefs. However, Smith emphasizes the individuality of the 
reader, whose interpretations express his or her personal "economy" 
of values (13). Fish argues that interpretive communities govern the 
practices of readers but not of individuals, who circulate among diverse 
communities. Bennett also says that the reading formations embedded 
in literary institutions govern the interpretations of individual readers, 
but, more Foucauldian than either Fish or Smith, Bennett claims that 
these reading formations enable schools and universities to discipline 
readers, ensuring that they constitute proper political/ethical subjects 
(Outside Literature 167). 
In other words, Bennett assumes that embedded in distinct institu- 
tions literary discourse produces its own social relations and does not 
simply mimic or distort them. In the nineteenth century, when the 
schools turned literature into what Bennett calls a "moral technology," 
the ideal teacher and, subsequently, the many-layered text, made the 
reader's interpretive activity the basis of his or her unending improve- 
ment. Bennett says that while traditional "bourgeois" criticism takes 
this technology to produce ethical improvement, Marxist criticism 
assumes that it provides ideological correction. However, both the 
bourgeois and the Marxist critic ignore the technology's power to 
constitute the subject (Outside Literature 175-90). 
Some opponents of this view might object that in a postmodern 
fashion it emphasizes the inescapable present, not theoretical critique, 
local academic interests, not the underlying social totality. Certainly 
Fredric Jameson, who dismisses the Foucauldian problematic of power 
as anti-Marxist, harshly condemns what he calls Bennett's "sinister 
variant" of a widespread "anti-intellectualism." As Jameson says, 
Bennett "does not seem to realize how obscene American readers are 
likely to find his proposals" ("Cultural Studies" 29). In effect, 
Jameson reduces Bennett's theory to the "obscene" proposal that 
radicals ought to support Jesse Jackson, Bill Clinton, and the Demo- 8




civic party. But Bennett's institutional history also bears on pedagogic 
issues, including the status of the Anglo-American canon, the place of 
cultural studies, the neglect of popular culture, the teacher-centered 
character of the classroom, and the gross inadequacies of state and 
federal funding. Jameson assumes, as does Theodor Adomo, that the 
instrumental rationality dominating modem society makes theoretical 
critique the only revolutionary force. But these pressing issues clearly 
require not only an engaged, institutional politics, but a historical 
analysis as well. 
I have argued that Bennett's account of literary studies gives 
Althusserian theory the Foucauldian history that its postmodern oppo- 
nents deny it, and yet, a skeptic could still refuse to believe that 
Althusserian theory is Foucauldian or postmodern. After all, without 
the social totality, theoretical critique, scientific truth, or class conflict 
very little of this Althusser looks or sounds like the Marxism that we 
know and love (or hate). Bennett suggests that our trying to answer this 
objection may not be worth the effort. Still, the objection is misleading. 
It assumes that we have defined once and for all the "true" nature of 
Marxism. The many scholars who consign Marxism to the dustbin of 
history accept this assumption, but Althusser, who insists that Marxism 
is a scientific field and not a set of doctrines, denies it. Bennett may not 
definitively establish the postmodern character of Athusserian theory, 
but he shows us what a poststructuralist Marxism might look like. This 
outline of the poststructuralist Althusser may be less conventional than 
the scientific or the rationalist Althusser, but this Althusser is not, on 
that account, the less important. 
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